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INTRODUCTION
This Essay takes its title from Professor Eric Foner’s 2019 Pulitzer Prize
winning book The Second Founding.1 Foner’s book traces the development and
adoption of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth Amendments and the
ensuing Reconstruction experience that endured until the election of 1876,
*

1

Coil Chair in Litigation, UC Hastings. I am indebted to Samantha Looker for excellent research
assistance and to Vince Moyer of the UC Hastings Library for source material on the 1988 Rules
Enabling Act amendments. I presented this paper at the festschrift in honor of Professor Stephen
Burbank on Feburary 12–13, 2021.
ERIC FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING (2019). Actually, another legal history book with nearly
the same title also appeared recently. See ILAN WURMAN, THE SECOND FOUNDING: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2020).
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a brief period that seemed to permit something approaching equality (at least
for men) in the South. In that sense, these political developments could have
amounted to a “second founding” to build on and move beyond the
Revolutionary War and original adoption of the Constitution. As we all know
too well today, that promise was extinguished around 1877, and during the
rest of the 19th century the nation instead saw the rise of Jim Crow laws,
paramilitary domestic terrorism managed by groups like the Ku Klux Klan,
and stasis for at least three quarters of a century in racial justice. Indeed, as
recent events in this country show, that stasis has not been left entirely
behind.
But my focus in on much less weighty matters and uses Professor Foner’s
title as a theme to address one of the (many) great accomplishments of
Professor Burbank’s storied career—his role in the 1988 amendments to the
Rules Enabling Act. No sensible person could contend that the 1934
adoption of the Enabling Act comes close to having significance similar to
the founding of the nation. At least for those in the civil procedure fraternity,
however, it is not so fanciful to regard the 1988 legislation as something of a
second founding in rulemaking for the federal courts. That is my theme.
Appreciating the significance of that 1988 effort requires some excavation
of the background and nature of the first founding for rulemaking, the fruits
of that founding, and the travails that led to the second founding in the 1980s.
Finally, drawing on almost a quarter century of experience from inside the
rulemaking apparatus, I will reflect on the impact of rulemaking’s second
founding. On the whole, that reflection shows more immediate and sustained
impact than Professor Foner’s second founding provided. It also shows that
the impact was mainly positive.
I. THE FIRST FOUNDING
Professor Burbank is the preeminent scholar on the first founding—the
1934 adoption of the Rules Enabling Act—beginning with his seminal booklength article in this Review.2 But for present purposes, it is useful to go
beyond invoking that work and add some background details.
Though it did immediately take up the Constitution’s invitation to create
lower federal courts, Congress did not try to regulate their procedure, and
instead—through the Process Acts and later the Conformity Act—directed
generally that the federal courts should adhere to the procedures of the courts

2

Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982).
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of the states in which they sat.3 That often was common law procedure, for
the English courts had proceeded for centuries without a procedure code. But
the English reliance on case law to devise procedures gradually grew
burdensome, and the English judges adopted the first rules of court to have
the force of law in the Anglo-American sphere—the 1834 Rules at Hilary
Term.4
The English effort at positivist court-based rulemaking was an abject
failure, leading to the infamous Crogate’s Case, which was satirized in the
Dialogue in the Shades.5 This failure was followed by what Professor Sunderland
described as the “English Struggle for Procedural Reform.”6 That struggle
led to the adoption in the Victorian era of the Judicature Acts, which sought
to modernize and improve court procedure, and to put procedure “under
public, not professional, regulation.”7
In this country, David Dudley Field embarked on a codification
movement designed to supplant court-made common law jurisprudence with
legislative provisions in a range of areas.8 His greatest success was with a
procedure code, leading, among other things, to the adoption of what came
to be called “code pleading.” Through legislation, many states adopted the
Field Code for their procedural regime; under the Process Acts and the
Conformity Act, that code would apply in the federal courts of those states
as well.
Though some regard the Field Code as a precursor to the Federal Rules,
that conclusion may be challenged.9 But the codification movement did

3
4
5

6
7
8
9

See id. at 1036–42.
See Roffey v. Smith, 172 Eng. Rep. 1409, 1409–10 (1834) (stating that the rules of Hilary Term
(referred to as “rules of pleading of H.T. 4 Will. IV”) “are part and parcel of the law of the land”).
See GEORGE HAYES, CROGATE’S CASE: A DIALOGUE IN YE SHADES, reprinted in 9 A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 417–31 (W.S. Holdsworth ed. 1926). This parody was a scathing attack on the
strictness of the pleading requirements of the Rules of Hilary Term. One of the most famous rulings
under those rules was in Crogate’s Case, holding that Crogate had no right to proceed due to his
violation of those rules. The parody was a conversation in Heaven between the ghost of Edward
Crogate and a Baron Surrebutter, supposedly a representative of Baron Parke, who was a moving
force behind the Hilary Term Rules. Those rules may be gone, but they are not entirely forgotten.
In his dissent in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, Justice Stevens invoked the “hypertechnical Hilary
rules of 1834.” 550 U.S. 573–574 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Edson Sunderland, The English Struggle for Procedural Reform., 39 HARV. L. REV. 725 (1926).
Id. at 737–39.
See generally Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier
Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311 (1988).
Id. at 312–13 (referring to the “myth” that the Field Code was a precursor of the Federal Rules).
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supplant judicial rulemaking in many states, particularly in the West.10 As
time went by, however, the bloom came off that rose:
The early promise of the code movement began to sour as successive
legislatures, in response to the importuning of special interest groups, added
layer upon layer of amendments to the code. Legislatures sought to regulate
every detail of court activity and to remedy procedural problems on a
piecemeal and patchwork basis. In New York, the Field Code turned into
the Throop Code, and grew “from 88 sections to over 1000, making it a legal
text of truly Byzantine complexity, a stellar trap for the unwary, and a source
of mischief to hapless litigants.” California’s code has suffered a similar fate.11

To those conversant with local practice, however arcane, it may have
been a great relief not to have to worry about a different set of rules to go to
federal court. And it was probably attractive to them to be able to
outmaneuver their opponents if the opponents were not equally steeped in
local procedure. But as the national economy became more and more
integrated, and communication and transportation improved, in the late
nineteenth century, disparities in court procedure among federal courts
could cause frustration as well.12 At the same time, some inveighed against
the tendency toward “gamesmanship” in litigation (perhaps also exploiting
local procedure), an attitude at the heart of Pound’s famous 1906 address to
the American Bar Association.13
There followed about twenty years of effort to supplant local practice with
a national procedural code for the federal courts.14 On occasion, this effort
was leavened by bombast, such as the assertion that it would be a way to
avoid “Bolshevism.”15 For some, opposition had a more proprietary tone, as
in this objection to the effort to achieve uniform procedure:
[A] firm in a great city may represent a railroad, or an industrial company
doing business in many states[;] if the procedure in the Federal Court is

10
11

12
13

14
15

California courts, for example, continue to function under the (amended) code of 1872. For a more
general review of the codification movement, see Subrin, supra note 8.
Glenn Koppell, Populism, Politics, and Procedure: The Saga of Summary Judgment and the Rulemaking Process
in California, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 455, 466 (1997) (quoting Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in
Judicial Rulemaking, 75 JUDICATURE 161, 163 (1991)).
See Burbank, supra note 2, at 1040–42.
Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, Address Before the
Am. Bar Ass’n (Aug. 29, 1906), in 29 ABA REPS. 395 (1906), reprinted in AMERICAN BAR ASS’N
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE CAUSES OF POPULAR DISSATISFACTION WITH
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1976).
For a chronicle of this effort, see Burbank, supra note 2, at 1043–95.
See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical
Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 955, 955 n.274 (1987) (reporting that proponents of the Enabling
Act “advocated simplified procedure as a means of improving democracy in order to reduce the
cause for bolshevik and other radical attacks on the courts.”).
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uniform this city firm can, itself, conduct the main parts of the litigation and
reduce the local lawyers substantially to filing clerks and advisors on jurors.
Uniformity, therefore, increases the influence and importance of the great
city firm . . . . Uniformity would further augment the importance of large
aggregations of men and depress the individual . . . .16

In Congress, the most vigorous opponent to nationalized procedure was
Senator Walsh of Montana. When President Roosevelt selected him to be
Attorney General, this seemingly sunk the project for national rules. But
Walsh died on his way to Roosevelt’s inauguration, and Homer Cummings
(a supporter of the Enabling Act) instead became Attorney General. Thus,
the first founding depended ultimately on a fortuity.
II. THE PROCEDURAL FRUITS OF THE FIRST FOUNDING
Much as the passage of the Rules Enabling Act was a breakthrough, it
was a breakthrough with a vacuum at its center. There was almost nothing
to show what should be included in the national procedural rules that would
supplant state court procedure. The Act said the Supreme Court could
promulgate a new procedure code, but it did not say how the Court was to
accomplish that. The Court surely did not intend to try to draft the new code
itself. After some uneven starts, the Court appointed an Advisory Committee
of leading lawyers, with Dean Charles Clark of Yale Law School as Reporter.
Since Dean Clark had a treatise on procedure,17 that might seem to fill in
some of the gaps on what might be included in the code (though not, of
course, at the time Congress passed the Enabling Act). And Professor
Sunderland was enlisted to address rules for pretrial, particularly discovery.
He had already carved out pro-discovery positions that might suggest his
later orientation.18 In all, the drafting committee included a number of very
prominent lawyers and several law professors, but no judges. Withal, it did
not seem a revolutionary group.
Particularly when measured against current rulemaking time lines, the
work of this drafting committee was extraordinary. In about two years, the
committee hammered out an entire set of rules. In the process, it made some
basic decisions. As Professor Subrin explained, it elected the elastic, openended approach of the Courts of Equity rather than the constricting attitudes
16

17
18

Steven N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules; Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural
Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2009 (1989) (quoting letter from Connor Hall to the Editor of
the American Bar Association Journal dated Oct. 15, 1926).
See CHARLES CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928).
See Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery
Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 698–710 (1998).
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of the common law courts.19 In place of the strictures of common law
pleading and of “fact pleading” as required by the codes, it directed only that
a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim, showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.”20 Altogether, the discovery package included
more discovery methods, with fewer limitations, than any prior set of
procedures. It was revolutionary.21 That might have been surmised from the
profile Sunderland already had on the subject.22 As Charles Clark put it more
than two decades later: “The system thus envisioned by Sunderland had no
counterpart at the time he proposed it.”23
For present purposes, an important point is that none of these
orientations was intrinsic in the legislation itself. Congress did not debate or
even consider seriously what should go into a uniform procedure for all the
federal courts. In a way, that contrasts with its closer attention to specific
procedural provisions in recent decades. As Professor Burbank has written,
the Enabling Act can be regarded as a sort of “treaty” between Congress and
the rulemakers.24 But one could also say that, at the outset, it was an
extremely open-ended authorization to allow somebody to devise the new
procedural system without significant tethers.
One might also characterize the Advisory Committee’s effort as infused
with zeal. Clark described former Attorney General William Mitchell, the
head of the drafting committee, as having “the enthusiasm and the drive of
19
20
21

See generally Subrin, supra note 15.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
Subrin, supra note 18, at 718–19. As explained by Professor Subrin:
[S]underland’s initial draft included every type of discovery that was known in the United
States and probably England up to that time. The list is familiar to any American litigator,
for almost every type of discovery he drafted became and remains part of the Federal Rules:
oral and written depositions; written interrogatories, motions to inspect and copy
documents and to inspect tangible and real property; physical and mental examinations of
persons; and requests for admissions.

22

23
24

Id. at 718. Sunderland’s discovery package was unprecedented. See Charles Clark, Edson
Sunderland and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 58 MICH. L. REV. 6, 11 (1959) (“The system thus
envisaged by Sunderland had no counterpart at the time he proposed it. It goes very much beyond
English procedure, which does not provide for general depositions of parties or witnesses.”).
For example, Sunderland wrote the Foreword for a path-breaking book published in 1932 where
he lauded a more wide-spread discovery process. See GEORGE RAGLAND, DISCOVERY BEFORE
TRIAL (1932); see also Edson Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863,
871 (1932) (asserting that courts have not had any problems with a more expansive discovery
system, and actually prefer its results).
Clark, supra note 21, at 11; see also Subrin, supra note 18, at 718–19 (describing the rules’ discovery
provisions as in further detail).
Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change: Who, How, Why, and When? 49 ALA. L. REV. 221,
230 (1997).
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a crusader.”25 Clark himself said that the dedicated reformer must pursue his
goal and leave compromises to others.26 One thing that might have enabled
this crusading effort was its insulation from outside pressures or even input.
According to Paul Carrington, Advisory Committee Reporter in the late
1980s, this insulation continued into the 1960s.27 Coupled with the blank
slate Congress had provided, this insulation probably contributed
significantly to the remarkable system that emerged. True, there was
supposedly some interaction with the bench and bar as the rules were
hammered out (remember that there were no judges on the drafting
committee, though quite a few professors), but that was nothing like the
current reality in the wake of the Second Founding.
And it is obvious that the rulemakers’ work product was not only
comprehensive but path-breaking—one might even say the work of
crusaders. As I have put it, the work was infused with a “Liberal Ethos.”28 In
the place of somewhat byzantine common law or code pleading
requirements, the rules enshrined what came to be known as “notice
pleading.”29 In place of trial by surprise, lambasted by Pound in 1906, the
new rules introduced an unprecedentedly broad array of discovery
procedures. Though they authorized a summary judgment procedure, the
rules were soon interpreted to forbid its use in any case in which there was
the “slightest doubt” about who should win, a very high standard indeed.30
Overall, as Professor Subrin has emphasized, the new procedure was
dramatically different from what preceded it and dramatically more elastic.31

25
26
27

28
29
30

31

Clark, supra note 21, at 9.
Charles E. Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules of Civil Procedure, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435, 448
(1958) (“[R]eformers must follow their dream and leave compromises to others . . . .”)
Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in Judicial Rulemaking, 75 JUDICATURE 161, 164 (1991) (“I have
been told by one of my predecessors, the late Al Sacks, that he was instructed to keep his work
entirely under wraps until the committee was prepared to make a recommendation.”).
See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM.
L. REV. 433, 439 (1986).
See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
See Doehler Metal Furniture Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 1945) (“A litigant has
a right to a trial where there is the slightest doubt as to the facts . . . .”). The following year Charles
Clark, who was by then sitting on the Second Circuit, resisted the “slightest doubt” standard in
another case overturning the district court’s grant of summary judgment. He cited Rule 56 and
criticized that majority’s ruling as “a novel method of amending rules of procedure” that “subverts
the plans and hopes of the profession for careful, informed study leading to the adoption and to the
amendment of simple rules . . . .” Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 479 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
See Subrin, supra note 15 at 956.
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As Professor Resnik has noted, it is somewhat surprising that the drafting
committee made this bold break with the past.32 The lawyers on the
committee were drawn from what would now be called Big Law (then called
white shoe firms), and their clients might soon recoil from the actuality of
litigation in the new environment. Not long after the new rules went into
effect, there was something of an uprising among some district judges about
the relaxed pleading standards, and the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council went
so far as to propose amending the pleading rules to require that “facts”
supporting a cause of action be included.33 In 1951, then-Judge Clark
convened a conference about discovery that produced objections that sound
strikingly contemporary. One participant, for example, objected: “We now
have about the worst and most destructive procedure devised by man to
hamper the administration of justice. On top of trial by deposition, we have
piled the injustices of unlimited discovery.”34
But as I have written before, the new rules swept the academy:
Professor Hazard called the Federal Rules “a major triumph of law reform.”
Professor Yeazell said that the Federal Rules “transformed civil litigation
[and] . . . reshaped civil procedure,” adding that the Rules were “surely” the
single most substantial procedural reform in U.S. history.” Professor Shapiro
opined that “they have influenced procedural thinking in every court in this
land . . . and indeed have become part of the consciousness of lawyers,
judges, and scholars who worry about and live with issues of judicial
procedure.” Professor Resnik found that they even “became a means of
transforming the modes of judging.”35

In a way, the new rules epitomized the optimism voiced by Professor
Millar in the mid twentieth century about a “law of procedural progress”
inexorably moving from rigidity to flexibility.36
Even after making this breakthrough, the original Advisory Committee
lived on, until ultimately discharged by the Supreme Court in 1956.37 But a

32

33

34
35
36
37

See Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 500 (1986)
(asking why the men of the drafting committee, often associated with interests linked to today to the
“defense bar,” sounded like “plaintiffs lawyers?”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Claim or Cause of Action: A Discussion of the Need for Amendment of Rule 8(a)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 13 F.R.D. 253, 256 (1952) (“A pleading . . . shall contain . . . a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, which statement
shall contain the facts constituting a cause of action . . . .” (emphasis in original).
The Practical Operation of Federal Discovery, 12 F.R.D. 131, 150 (1951) (transcribing the
statement of George Pike).
Richard L. Marcus, Not Dead Yet, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 299, 301 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 5–6 (1952).
Order Discharging Advisory Committee, 352 U.S. 803 (1956).
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new Advisory Committee was soon appointed, and the Liberal Ethos
remained predominant. At the time, Chief Justice Warren cautioned the new
Advisory Committee against “radical changes.”38 In 1966, the joinder rules
were revised, and the “modern class action” under Rule 23(b)(3) came into
existence.39 In 1970, the discovery rules were expanded and somewhat
relaxed.40 As Professor Burbank has noted, this does not sound like what
Chief Justice Warren advised.41 At least in retrospect, this period has come
to be known to some as rulemaking’s “Golden Age.”42 As with other golden
ages, it came to an end. Perhaps golden ages only look golden in retrospect,
and not at the time.
III. THE SECOND FOUNDING
It is somewhat difficult to pinpoint when the worm began to turn for
expansive federal procedure rules. It seems pretty clear, however, that
confidence in the inexorable relaxation or procedure that Professor Millar
forecast in 195243 began to abate in the 1970s. Already in 1975, a Penn
professor had urged changes to the Enabling Act, though focused on the
Criminal Rules rather than the Civil Rules.44 In 1979, Representative
Holtzman introduced a bill that would amend the Enabling Act in a variety

38
39
40

41

42
43
44

Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking and Litigation Reform: An Institutional
Approach, 15 NEV. L.J. 1559, 1566 (2015).
See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1624 (2018) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
didn’t create the modern class action until 1966”).
See Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 748–49 (1998) (noting that
the 1970s amendments continued to relax discovery rules by eliminating the requirement for a
motion to obtain document production and the removal of the “good cause” standard for
production of documents) (footnotes omitted). Professor Burbank expands: “The 1966 amendments
to Rule 23 (Class Actions) alone constituted ‘great changes,’ and many would similarly characterize
the 1970 discovery amendments, which included substantial revisions to Rules 26 (General
Provisions), 30 (Depositions), 33 (Interrogatories), 34 (Document Production), 36 (Requests for
Admissions), and 37 (Sanctions).” Burbank & Farhang, supra note 38, at 1566.
See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 38, at 1566 (“[F]ew if any observers of federal court rulemaking
would characterize the work of the reconstituted Advisory Committee from 1960 through 1971 as
merely keeping the Federal Rules up-to-date . . . . [T]he Advisory Committee produced substantial
packages of amendment that became effective in 1961, 1963, 1966, 19970, and 1971.”)
See Robert Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural
Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 897 (1999) (referring to the “Golden Age of Court Rulemaking”).
See supra note 36 and accompanying text (noting Professor Millar’s expectation that procedure
would inexorably move from rigidity to flexibility).
See Howard Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Making Process: A Time for Re-Examination, 61 A.B.A. J. 579, 580
(1975) (urging “a full-scale inquiry into the process”).
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of ways.45 Then, in 1980 Professor Burbank’s magisterial article about the
original adoption of the Enabling Act appeared.46 Congressional attention to
rulemaking persisted, eventually leading to the 1988 amendments to the
Enabling Act.
One way of looking at the period leading up to the apogee of the Liberal
Ethos is, in Professor Burbank’s words, that “[t]he period from 1960 to 1971
was one in which the net balance [of rule amendments] clearly favored
plaintiffs.”47 It may be that the arrival of Warren Burger as Chief Justice
played a role in the subsequent orientation48 of rule changes, which
Professors Burbank and Farhang demonstrate (as many had sensed)
represented a shift in the trend line.49 Along the way, the mix of lawyers and
judges on the Advisory Committee changed, with a majority of members
being judges when Burger was Chief Justice (and since). Relying on judges
might tend toward relaxing the pressures to favor one side or the other, as
judges as a group may be more neutral than lawyers who can be (and are)
identified with defense or plaintiff interests. But, of course, judges are not
interchangeable, and the Chief Justice made (and makes) the choice of which
judges to appoint to the Advisory Committee.
In any event, in the 1970s there began a period of some controversy about
rule change proposals. A 1978 proposal to revise the scope of discovery
excited much opposition.50 A proposal to dispense with filing of discovery
materials in court prompted letters from Senator Kennedy (Chair of the
Senate Judiciary Committee) and Representative Drinan (a member of the
House Judiciary Committee) raising questions about these changes.51 The
45

46
47
48

49

50

51

See 96 Cong. Rec. 63–65 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1979) (statement of Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman)
(proposing, among other things, that the rulemaking authority be moved from the Supreme Court
to the Judicial Conference, that rulemaking activities would be open to the public, with votes open
to public scrutiny, and that no rule change could go into effect without affirmative action by
Congress).
Burbank, supra note 2.
Burbank & Farhang, supra note 38, at 1579.
See id. at 1580–85 (noting that Chief Justice Burger shifted the balance in the Advisory Committee
to consist mainly of judges rather than practicing lawyers and urged the need for “major changes”
in procedure, which was “very different advice” from what Chief Justice Warren had told the
rulemakers a decade before).
See id. at 1576–80 (explaining the authors’ statistical analysis, and concluding from that analysis
that, from 1960 to 2011, the net balance of the Advisory Committee’s proposals affecting private
enforcement shifted away from favoring plaintiffs).
See Marcus, supra note 40, at 756–60 (explaining, among other proposed changes, the Advisory
Committee’s proposal to narrow the scope of discovery, and a variety of critical responses that
emerged in response to that proposal).
See Letter from Sen. Edward Kennedy, Chair, Comm. on the Judiciary, to William Foley, Dir.,
Admin. Off. of the United States Cts., (July 29, 1980) (on file with author) (expressing concern about
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1978 proposed change to the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b)(1) was
ultimately withdrawn by the Advisory Committee,52 and the change to filing
of discovery was shelved.53 Various proposals to retool Rule 68 were
examined as a way to curtail “groundless” litigation. These Rule 68 efforts
were eventually discontinued, to applause from Professor Burbank.54
Perhaps most telling, however, was the 1983 amendment to Rule 11,
which authorized sanctions for asserting unfounded claims or defenses. The
tumult over this rule change—and its seeming anti-plaintiff bias—
reverberated through rulemaking. The Third Circuit embarked on a booklength study of how the rule was being applied, for which Professor Burbank
was Reporter.55 John Frank, a member of the Advisory Committee during
the halcyon days of the 1960s, called the 1983 amendment to Rule 11 “the
most unfortunate exercise in rulemaking of at least the last twenty years.”56
Judge Schwarzer, soon to become head of the Federal Judicial Center, wrote
in 1988 that “Rule 11 has become a significant factor in civil litigation, with
an impact that likely exceeded its drafters’ expectations.”57 Professor
Burbank made much the same point in 1989:
The Advisory Committee knew little about experience under the original
Rule, knew little about the perceived problems that stimulated the efforts
leading to the two packages of Rules amendments in 1980 and 1983, knew
little about the jurisprudence of sanctions, and knew little about the benefits
and costs of sanctions as a case management device.58

In 1991, the Advisory Committee itself issued an unprecedented “call”
for comment on the rule.59 There followed amendments to the rule effective
1993 that Judge Shadur labeled the “fang-drawing 1993 amendments.”60

52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

“possible harm which could result to interested parties and the general public” from
implementation of the amended rule excusing filing of discovery materials); Letter from Rep.
Robert Drinan, Chair, Subcomm. on Crim. Just. of the House Judiciary Comm., to Joseph Spaniol,
Deputy Dir. of the Admin. Off. of the United Sates Cts. (June 24, 1980) (relaying concern that the
rule change “not permit or encourage the waiver of the filing requirements except where the
balance of public and private interest tips in favor of waiver”).
Marcus, supra note 40, at 759.
It returned in the 2000 amendments to Rule 5(d), which were adopted.
For a chronicle of this history, see generally Stephen B. Burbank, Proposals to Amend Rule 68: Time to
Abandon Ship, 19 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 425 (1986).
STEPHEN B. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION (1989).
John Frank, The Rules of Civil Procedure—Agenda for Reform, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1883, 1886 (1989).
William Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1013 (1988).
Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 1925, 1927 (1989).
See Call for Written Comments on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Related
Rules, 131 F.R.D. 335, 337 (1990).
Stove Builder Int’l, Inc. v. GHP Group, Inc., 280 F.R.D. 402, 403 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
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John Frank, having denounced the 1983 version, spoke highly of the 1993
amendments.61 Justice Scalia, meanwhile, objected to the 1993 amendments,
arguing that they would “render the Rule toothless.”62
The Rule 11 episode was certainly a black eye for rulemaking. But there
is at least some reason to accept Judge Schwarzer’s conclusion that the
rulemakers did not see this controversy coming.63 At least one published
critique of the proposed 1983 amendment objected that it would
“emasculate” the rule by removing the former authority to strike pleadings
filed in violation of the rule.64 At the same time the rulemakers proposed the
Rule 11 amendments, they also added Rule 26(g) regarding discovery,
imposing essentially the same regime for discovery requests and responses—
that the lawyer submitting them certified that there was good ground for the
request or response. These two amendments were expected to work in
tandem and have a similar impact. But history did not turn out that way:
At the time the 1983 amendments were adopted, it was supposed that Rule
26(g) was at least as important, and would be at least as much used, as Rule
11. That did not prove to be the case. Rule 11 was invoked many times,
while Rule 26(g) has not been much used. Largely as a consequence,
although Rule 11 was substantially amended in 1993, Rule 26(g)(2) was
slightly revised as to form but not much changed except to take account of
the addition that year of mandatory disclosure obligations.65

As Professor Burbank put it in 1997, the Rule 11 experience produced a
“poisonous environment” for rulemaking.66 It seems unlikely that the Rule
68 episodes helped.67 As explained later by the Reporter of the Advisory
Committee:
Partly in response to the 1983 amendments, but especially to a proposal
made in 1984 to amend Rule 68 to deter non-settlement, Congressman

61

62
63
64

65
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67

See Henry J. Reske, Tinkering with Procedure: Federal Committee Back Automatic Disclosure,
Restrained Rule 11, 78 A.B.A. J. 14 (1992) (quoting John Frank as saying that the proposed revision
was “a major victory for our side”).
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 507 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
See supra text accompanying note 57–58.
See Jonathan J. Lerner & Seth M. Schwartz, Why Rule 11 Shouldn’t Be Changed: The Proposed Cure Might
Exacerbate the Disease, NAT’L L.J., May 9, 1983 (expressing fear that the 1983 Rule 11 amendment,
by eliminating the prior provision for striking pleadings signed in violation of the rule, would “place
even this limited safeguard in jeopardy”).
8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2052 at 348 (3d ed. 2010).
Burbank, supra note 24, at 228.
See generally Burbank, supra note 54 (asserting that proposals to amend Rule 68 raised questions about
the scope of the rulemakers’ power, particularly in light of the pending legislative proposals that
became the 1988 amendments to the Enabling Act).
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Robert Kastenmeier, then chair of the House Judiciary Committee, took an
interest in the Rules Enabling Act. He proposed to revise the Act, partly in
response to suggestions from Professor Stephen Burbank and others, to make
federal judicial rulemaking more open to public view and thus more
responsive.68

Before the 1988 Act, the Enabling Act was notably unfocused on the
method by which the Supreme Court would exercise its delegated power to
adopt procedure rules for the federal courts. As noted above, after the 1934
Act was adopted there was much uncertainty about how those rules were to
be drafted, and the content of the rules was, in terms of Congressional
directives, almost a complete blank.69 As Professor Burbank urged in a
submission to Congress in 1984, one could regard what was needed as
“attention by the rulemakers to what might be called the substantive
jurisprudence of rulemaking.”70
The 1988 Enabling Act took major steps in that direction. It did not
include some ideas that were raised during the drafting process, such as
moving the authority to adopt amendments to the Judicial Conference,
eliminating the Supersession Clause,71 or requiring that rules committees be
“representative.”72 But it did add a new section to the United States Code
68
69

70

71
72

Carrington, supra note 27, at 164.
True, the Act did say that “such rules” must not “abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right”
and that the rule changes could not take effect until ninety days after they were presented to
Congress, which might interrupt their implementation. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
Letter from Prof. Stephen B. Burbank, Assoc. Professor of L., U. Pa. L. Sch., to Rep. Robert
Kastenmeier, Rep., United States House of Rep. (Jan. 13, 1984), in Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Cts., Civ. Lib., and the Admin. of J. of the Comm. of the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 204–05 (1984).
It is worth noting that in 1958 Congress had added the following to 28 U.S.C. § 331:
The [Judicial] Conference shall also carry on a continuous study of the operation and effect
of the general rules of practice and procedure now or hereafter in use as prescribed by the
Supreme Court for the other courts of the United States pursuant to law. Such changes in
and additions to those rules as the Conference may deem desirable to promote simplicity
in procedure, fairness in administration, the just determination of litigation, and the
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay shall be recommended by the Conference
from time to time to the Supreme Court for its consideration and adoption, modification
or rejection, in accordance with law.
Act of July 11, 1958, P.L. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356. This addition did little, however, to deal with the
matters later addressed by the 1988 amendments to the Enabling Act.
For background on the supersession issue, see Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul
Carrington’s “Substance and Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012, 1037–44 (1989).
For those interested, here is Professor Burbank’s report on the fate of this idea:
[A] requirement that “[e]ach such committee shall consist of a balanced cross section of
bench and bar, and trial and appellate judges” was part of the House bill that passed in
1985 and 1988. The provision was not part of the 1988 legislation, however, which
substituted the language in the Senate bill: “Each such committee shall consist of members
of the bench and the professional bar, and trial and appellate judges.”
Burbank & Farhang, supra note 38, at 1588.
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called the “Method of Prescribing,” which detailed how to make rule
changes.73 This provision includes many things urged during the
Congressional process, including:
• The Judicial Conference must prescribe and publish procedures for
consideration of rule amendments;74
• Rulemaking committees “shall consist of members of the bench and
the professional bar, and trial and appellate judges”;75
• Each meeting “for the transaction of business” of the Standing
Committee and any Advisory Committee must be open to the public
with minutes of the meeting made available to the public;76
• Advance notice must be given of each such rulemaking meeting;77 and
• Any recommendation for a rule amendment must include an
explanatory note on the rule and a written report explaining the
reason for the amendment and including any minority or other
separate views.78
IV. LIFE AFTER THE SECOND FOUNDING: RULEMAKING IN THE
FISHBOWL
As suggested by Dean Carrington,79 the public access directed by the
1988 Act was a break with the past. According to a 1983 report of the
secretary to the Standing Committee, “Advisory committees usually meet
whenever the need arises. When an Advisory Committee reaches agreement
on a tentative draft proposal, the draft is then circulated widely to the bench
and bar for comment.”80 That obviously would no longer suffice, given the
requirement for advance notice of meetings and public access to them. The
various advisory committees now have a fairly set schedule of Spring and Fall
meetings, and the Standing Committee meets in June and January. The
precise dates vary, but the schedule is sufficiently fixed to be known to those
interested.

73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

28 U.S.C. § 2073 (2018).
Id. § 2073(a)(1).
Id. § 2073(a)(2). Note that this does not go further and insist that such committees be
“representative.”
Id. § 2073(c)(1).
Id. § 2073(c)(2).
Id. § 2073(d).
See Carrington, supra note 27 at 164.
Joseph F. Spaniol Jr., Making Federal Rules: The Inside Story, 69 A.B.A. J. 1645, 1646 (1983).
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Fairly immediately after the adoption of the 1988 Act, there was much
gloom among academics about the rulemaking enterprise. Charles Alan
Wright, as great an oracle as we had, said that he was “gloomier about the
status of the rulemaking process than I had ever been.”81 Professor Mullenix
saw the guillotine in the rulemakers’ future, worrying that the Advisory
Committee might go “the way of the French aristocracy.”82 In the 1990s,
Professor Walker spoke of “the most serious challenge to the procedural
status quo since the adoption of the original Federal Rules in 1938.”83
Professor Bone said that “the court rulemaking model is under siege.”84
Professor Burbank, meanwhile, observed that federal rulemaking had
become “a new ballgame.”85 He was right, and it is not clear that he mourned
that change.
I am here to report that federal rulemaking lives on. For nearly a quarter
century, I’ve spent considerable time and energy on the inside of federal
rulemaking.86 One easy conclusion to announce based on that experience is
81
82
83
84
85
86

Charles Alan Wright, Foreword, the Malaise of Federal Rulemaking, 14 REV. LITIG. 1, 9 (1994).
Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69
N.C.L. REV. 795, 802 (1991).
Laurens Walker, The End of the New Deal and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1269,
1271 (1997).
Bone, supra note 42, at 888.
Burbank, supra note 71, at 1035.
Much of this Part is based on my recollection of events in which I was personally involved. That’s
not terribly common in law reviews. Usually, law review articles consist of reports by the author of
what turned up in research in books and other media. The heart of this paper, however, is not like
that. Part IV, which is about the post-1988 rulemaking experience, is not based on what I learned
from books. Instead, it is about my lived experience over the last quarter century on the inside of
rulemaking. Most of what I describe is also reflected in the official records of the Administrative
Office (“A.O.”) of the United States Courts and available online (www.uscourts.gov). But my report
here is about what I remember, not about what is in those records, which consist largely of things I
have written and directed be inserted into the public record. On occasion, I will refer the reader to
some of these materials, but that does not mean they form the actual basis for Part IV of this paper,
which is instead based on my recollection, not the contents of these records. Any who are interested
in additional details can read through the thousands of pages of agenda books posted on the A.O.
website.
This peculiar feature of my paper prompted repeated instructions from the law review editors
that “a citation is required” to support assertions in text. Though some such citations could be
found, I resisted the editors on the ground that I am not actually basing this paper on what is in
these records, most of which I wrote myself. I want to thank the editors for their flexibility and
emphasize that the unorthodox approach was my own doing.
Owing to my role, some of the things that Professor Burbank has noted in his writings about
rulemaking are simply background for my experience, in a sense “above my pay grade.” Consider,
for example, the following observation: “Among 103 appointments or reappointments of Article III judges
to the committee, the split was 72 percent to 28 percent in favor of Republican appointees.”
Burbank & Farhang, supra note 38, at 1572. In the same vein, the article also notes that during the
period 1971 to 2013, 0.18 percent of judges appointed by Democratic presidents served on the

2478

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23:6

that federal rulemaking remains alive and pretty well. As I said in 2008, it’s
“not dead yet.”87 Instead, there have been major packages of rule
amendments in 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2015, and 2018. In addition, in
2007 the entire set of rules was restyled, an arduous effort that received a
welcome and much appreciated assist from Professor Burbank.
In this Part, I want to reflect on what rulemaking is like in the fishbowl in
which it has operated since the Second Founding. I can affirm that the
“sunshine” nature of the rulemaking process contrasts with the approach of
other Judicial Conference committees, at least in my experience. Thus, along
with two judges who were both eventually Chairs of the Advisory Committee
and the Standing Committee, I attended a meeting of another Judicial
Conference committee to report on matters of joint interest. The reporting
session involved quite a few other people in addition to us three as
representatives of the rules committees, and it lasted the full morning of the
meeting. The relevant point is that, after a pleasant lunch with the
committee, all of the nonmembers—even the two very distinguished
judges—were politely but firmly told that they were not welcome to attend
the remainder of the meeting. That is not how rules committees now operate.
A. Did The 1988 Act Actually Cause A Rulemaking Change?
Before addressing the ways in which the changes wrought by the 1988
Act have affected the rulemaking enterprise, it is worth reflecting briefly on
whether the Act was necessary or sufficient to cause these changes. There is
at least some reason to think that more openness would have occurred
regardless of whether Congress had acted in the 1980s. Already in the late
1970s the rulemakers had decided to hold public hearings about the various
discovery amendments under consideration.88
Despite these precursors, it seems difficult to regard the 1988 Act as
irrelevant to rulemaking as it now operates. As explored below, the current
openness of rulemaking, and the existence of publicly available procedures,
means that members of the bar, and even members of the general public, can
(and do) submit amendment proposals that are reviewed by the Advisory
Committee. The Committee maintains a roster of pending proposals, and

87
88

committee, compared with 0.47 percent of judges appointed by Republican presidents. Id. at 1573.
See also id. at 1574 (“[N]on-white judges are less likely to serve on the Advisory Committee.”).
Reporters take the rule committees as they find them.
See Marcus, supra note 35 at 300.
See Marcus, supra note 40, at 758 n.58 (detailing how the 1978 Committee held hearings on
proposed rule amendments for the first time).
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those proposals are explained and presented in agenda books and at Advisory
Committee meetings, even if no action is recommended. Familiarity with
what is on the agenda is fairly widespread among the cognoscenti, a somewhat
narrow band of the profession, but one much larger than the Committee
itself. Indeed, the accessibility of the agenda sometimes causes worries that
even reaching the point of circulating draft language might inadvertently and
incorrectly send the message that “the train has left the station.”
The reporting requirements, along with the need to provide detailed
minutes of meetings, and about testimony and comments during the public
comment process about proposed amendments, means that there is a wealth
of public material about what the rules committees do. Yes, the Second
Founding has made a distinct difference. In Professor Burbank’s words: “As
a result of the House Hearings [on rulemaking practices] and the threat of
legislation, as well as the earlier criticisms, the judiciary institutionalized steps
previously used but sparingly (e.g., public hearings) and adopted and
published rulemaking procedures.”89
It is impossible to say what would have happened without the legislation,
but also impossible to say the changed practices would have occurred without
any outside pressure at all.
B. Sunshine, Lobbyists And Outreach
The work of the Advisory Committee no longer occurs behind a screen
or in the dark. As a “sunshine committee,” it permits interested persons to
attend its meetings. It posts the agenda books for those meetings well in
advance of the meetings, and posts minutes of the meetings as well. It also
posts all proposals for rule changes that it receives on the Administrative
Office (A.O.) website as well as keeping tabs on when action is taken on those
proposals. There is, as a result, a very large volume of material about the
rulemakers’ activities available online. Though mastering the A.O. website
takes a bit of practice, the main impediment to following what the Advisory
Committee does is volume—the agenda book for each of the two Advisory
Committee meetings each year is likely to be 400 pages long.
The Advisory Committee also hears regularly from a number of
organizations, which ordinarily send representatives to attend its meetings as
well as make proposals for rule changes and comment on pending topics of
Committee consideration and on published amendment drafts. Examples
include the Litigation Section of the American Bar Association, the
89

Burbank & Farhang, supra note 38, at 1586.
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American College of Trial Lawyers, the Lawyers for Civil Justice, the
American Association for Justice, and the National Employment Lawyers
Association. One could perhaps regard some of these organizations (and
others who attend meetings) as lobbyists of a sort. That may relate to the
possibility that rulemakers in the new order might find themselves led to the
scaffold.90 Though it is important for committee members and Reporters to
avoid accepting any favors from these interested parties (i.e., not even a glass
of wine), the participation of such people has been a boon, not a burden.
This openness flows from the 1988 Act’s requirements, and has been very
helpful in a wide variety of ways. It goes well beyond what the Act required,
however. As Professor Burbank has noted, when Judge Patrick
Higginbotham was Chair of the Advisory Committee, he “concentrated on
outreach to the bar and to the academy.”91 That outreach continued and has
flowered. Starting in the late 1990s, the Advisory Committee and/or one of
its subcommittees often held conferences or mini-conferences to gather
informal reactions on issues under consideration by the Committee.92 The
Act did not require these efforts.
Not only did such outreach enable the bar to know what was on the
Committee’s plate, it also permitted the Committee to learn about what was
happening in the practice. A striking example emerged in the January 1997
mini-conference on possible amendments to the discovery rules (which
ultimately led to the 2000 discovery amendments). The list of ideas on display
was somewhat a “plain vanilla” collection of changes, but the lawyers in
attendance wanted to talk about something new and different—discovery of
email. Many of them were literally tearing their hair over this problem.
Several buttonholed me (as the Reporter who worked on discovery) to urge
that the rules should make clear that email fell within Rule 34’s “document”
production requirements. They were having trouble too often getting their
clients to understand that this material was subject to discovery.93 But for the
outreach efforts, the Committee might not have gotten wind of these
problems until much later.

90
91
92
93

See supra text accompanying note 82 (expressing worry that rulemaking might go the way of the
Ancien Regime).
Burbank & Farhang, supra note 38, at 1591.
For a list of early events of this sort, see Richard L. Marcus, Reform Through Rulemaking?, 80 WASH.
U. L.Q. 901, 918 n.102 (2002).
For a chronicle of these early efforts, see generally Richard L. Marcus, Only Yesterday: Reflections on
the Rulemaking Response to E-Discovery, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 17 (2004) (detailing the challenges
presented by adapting the rules of discovery to these technological changes).
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Learning that there is a problem does not mean, however, that there is a
rule-based solution, or show what that solution might be. To take e-discovery
as an example, vehement as the lawyers were that something should be done,
they were perplexed about what that something should be. The Discovery
Subcommittee convened two mini-conferences during 2000 to examine
possible rule changes responsive to this new (and rapidly changing) discovery
challenge, but eventually concluded that circumstances were too fluid and
uncertain to confect a rules-based solution at that time. Only at the end of
2006 (nearly a decade after the problems were first raised in January 1997)
did the “e-discovery amendments” to the rules come into effect. And even
then, the challenge of social media discovery lay almost entirely in the future.
The 1988 Act did command the Committee to publish draft amendments
and hold hearings about them as well as inviting written comments. This
requirement has sometimes seemed a chore (particularly for Reporters tasked
with preparing summaries of the comments). But it was also an important
safety valve. Recall the possibility that the drafters of the 1983 amendment
to Rule 11—who did not have the benefit of the fulsome public comment
period required by the 1988 Act—seemingly did not foresee the effect the
amendment would have.94 Hearings focus the mind and the Committee in
ways that permit at least some such consequences to be discovered before
they become a major force in litigation.
The first set of hearings I attended as Reporter in 1998-99 offers one
example—two provisions in the amendment package that lawyers told us
were linked though the Committee had not appreciated this argument would
be made. One was an amendment to Rule 26(b)(1) (eventually adopted in
2000) to redefine the scope of discovery as initially limited to material
“relevant to any party’s claim or defense,” rather than to anything relevant
to the “subject matter” of the action, as previously provided. But the
amendment allowed the judge to expand the scope to the “subject matter”
limits on a showing of good cause. The other was framed as an amendment
to Rule 34 that would authorize a judge to permit “disproportionate”
document discovery if the requesting party would bear the cost of that
additional discovery. As conceived, these proposed amendments were
entirely separate. Yet lawyer after lawyer (from both the plaintiff and
defendant side of the bar) told us in the hearings that whenever a judge found
good cause to expand discovery to the subject matter limit under amended

94

See supra text accompanying notes 57–58.
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Rule 26(b)(1), that should automatically trigger the cost-bearing provision in
the proposed amendment to Rule 34.
That reading of the amendment proposals mis-conceived their purpose.
A judge’s decision that there was good cause to expand the scope of discovery
would be the reverse of a decision that the proposed discovery was
disproportionate. So redrafting of the Committee Notes ensued, though
ultimately the Rule 34 proposal was not adopted and the issue vanished.
Only with this insight from the hearing process could the Committee have
appreciated and responded to what might otherwise be coming. This sort of
insight is fairly familiar to rulemakers, and the resulting clarifications can
avoid problems later on.
In somewhat the same vein, the witnesses that appear at hearings, along
with the public comment process, help to sharpen the Committee Notes that
accompany rule amendments. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court (or at least
Justice Scalia) sometimes treated such explanatory material as the same as
congressional legislative history, which Justice Scalia did not respect.95 It may
well be that legislative history is drafted after the fact and never reviewed by
the legislators who vote on the legislation, but Committee Notes are quite
different. As Professor Rowe (a member of the Committee in the 1990s)
observed after his term on the Committee expired, “the members and
Reporters—as well as the members of the public commenting on possible
changes—devoted considerable attention to the explanatory notes as well as
to the text of the proposed rules.”96
So the public comment requirement has served the Committee well.
Indeed, as already noted, the Committee regularly goes beyond what the
1988 Act requires with mini-conferences and full conferences. Beyond that,
it sometimes invites comments in an informal manner not called for by the
Act. For example, in mid-2020 all the rules committees invited input from
the public about litigation difficulties resulting from the COVID pandemic.
95

96

For discussion of Justice Scalia’s attitude toward Committee Notes, see Catherine Struve, The
Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1157 (2002).
As Professor Struve notes there, Scalia argued that “there is no certainty that either we or
[Congress] read [the Notes], nor is there any process by which we formally endorse or disclaim
them.” Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). On the other hand, as Professor Struve also points out, when Justice
Scalia dissented from the 1993 amendment to Rule 11, he discussed the Committee Note as well
as the rule itself. See Order of April 22, 1993, 146 F.R.D. 404, 508–09 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part);
see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 363 (2011) (Scalia, J.) (“It is the Rule itself,
not the description of it, that governs.”).
Thomas Rowe, A Square Peg in a Round Hole? The 2000 Limitation on the Scope of Federal Civil Discovery,
69 TENN. L. REV. 13, 29 (2001).
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And in connection with consideration of changes to Rule 30(b)(6), the Civil
Rules Committee sought commentary on a half dozen ideas that had been
raised.97
In sum, whether or not the rulemakers would have “gone public” on their
own,98 the 1988 Act was much more a boon than a burden. The arrival of
hundreds of comments may demonstrate that something is more
controversial than previously appreciated.99 But at other times, outbursts of
commentary do not seem warranted by the proposed amendments. A prime
example, in my opinion, was the 2017 proposal to make two minor changes
in Rule 30(b)(6). That amendment cycle nonetheless drew more than 1,780
public comments, about half of them in the last week.100 They were so
numerous and repetitive that I eventually had my research assistant compile
a list of the topics raised and the names of the commenters that was included
in the comment summary in the official agenda book.101 Moreover, a large
proportion of the comments were about ideas that had been considered (and
identified in the informal invitation for input described above) but were
dropped before the publication of a formal amendment proposal.
Continuing to object to ideas that have been dropped is not helpful.
It is also worth noting that the volume of comments does not seem always
to correspond to the value of the points they make. Indeed, on occasion we
have seen both “sides” reaching out to their supporters with a pitch along the
lines of “The other side is sending in hundreds of comments; we have to
match them.” Perhaps that is how Congress weighs public comments, but
volume is not often a prime consideration for the Advisory Committee. One
thoughtful insight is worth more than a hundred “me too” comments.
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For a summary of those comments, see Advisory Comm. On Civ. Rules, Agenda: Meeting of the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, U.S. Cts. at 217–91 (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.uscourts.gov/rulespolicies/archives/agenda-books/advisory-committee-rules-civil-procedure-november-2017.
As
noted below, this informal activity can produce untoward consequences; when a more limited set
of Rule 30(b)(6) changes were formally proposed, much of the commentary focused on ideas that
were left on the cutting room floor in part due to the comments described above.
See supra text accompanying notes 86–88.
Burbank & Farhang, supra note 38, at 1595 (“The fact that more than 2,300 comments were
submitted on the preliminary draft of the 2013 proposed amendments shows that, notwithstanding
repeated characterization of the proposals as ‘modest’ or ‘measured’ by some rulemakers and
interest groups, they in fact have ‘trigger[ed] powerful interest group mobilization’ on both sides.”).
Advisory Comm. On Civ. Rules, Agenda: Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, U.S. Cts at
201 (Apr. 2–3, 2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/advisorycommittee-rules-civil-procedure-april-2019. For more general summaries of those comments, see
id. at 125–202.
See id. at 193–202 (consisting of a memorandum from Lauren Lee to Richard L. Marcus).
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C. Empiricism
Ultimately, any rule proposal is an empirical guess or gamble. If it does
not solve the problem it is designed to solve, it is a failure. If there really is
not a problem, then making a change is risky business.
In the insulated world of pre-1988 rulemaking, the best that could be
obtained was some form of “armchair empiricism,” and those in the
armchair were often limited to those in the room.102 Five years after the
passage of the 1988 Act, Professor Burbank went so far as to call for a
moratorium on rule amendments pending development of sufficient
empirical information to support changing rules.103 Four years later he
acknowledged that the judiciary “has come to recognize the value of seeking
empirical data before formulating new or amended Federal Rules.”104
The Advisory Committee not only can make outreach efforts105 but it can
also draw on the remarkable empirical research facilities of the Federal
Judicial Center (FJC).106 In 1985, Judge Posner urged that all proposed
procedural changes be tested before adoption.107 Since the adoption of the
1988 Act, the Advisory Committee has increasingly drawn on the (limited)
sort of data that FJC Research can provide, but there will likely not often be
the sort of testing that Judge Posner endorsed.108 In all likelihood, there will
almost always be something of an “armchair” aspect to the Committee’s
empirical focus. “[I]f procedural reform could only be adopted after being
proved effective and safe in a manner similar to the way the FDA determines
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It’s worth noting that before 1988 the rulemakers began outreach designed to invite additional
perspectives. For discussion of the input the Committee received regarding the 1978 amendment
proposal regarding the scope of discovery, see Marcus, supra note 40, at 758–59.
Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV.
841, 841–842 (1993). Among others, he was commenting on my article Of Babies and Bathwater: The
Prospects of Procedural Progress. Id.
Burbank, supra note 24, at 242.
See supra text accompanying notes 91–92.
See generally, Thomas Willging, Past and Potential Uses of Empirical Research in Civil Rulemaking, 77 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1121 (2002) (commenting on how and when the Committee has contacted the FJC
for assistance in empirically examining the operation of the rules).
See Richard Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV., 366, 367 (1986) (“The success or failure of the procedure [change] must be verifiable
by accepted means of (social) science hypothesis testing.”). It is worth noting that there was no such
social science testing of the procedures already in place from 1938 forward.
One effort somewhat along those lines is the “pilot project” in the Northern District of Illinois and
the District of Arizona testing expanded initial disclosure provisions. See, e.g., Advisory Comm. On
Civ. Rules, Agenda: Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, U.S. Cts. at 357–94 (Oct. 29, 2019),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2019–10_civil_rules_agenda_book.pdf (reporting
on initial disclosure pilot projects in D. Az. and N.D. Ill.).
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whether a new drug can be sold, it seems unlikely that there would be any
formal procedural reform.”109 Indeed, some of the most committed Realist
empiricists struck out when they tried to investigate the actual effects of legal
rules on human behavior.110
And for those who insist that no changes may be made in the rules
without something approaching the “FDA Seal of Approval,” it suffices to
note in response that the Liberal Ethos breakthroughs had no such support.
Charles Clark was associated with the Realist movement, but it is difficult to
find that he marshalled the sort of empirical data now urged to support the
radical reset the rules introduced in 1938. In 1906, Roscoe Pound had even
less, relying on a review of reported federal cases to support his (likely
justified) claims of excessive adversarialness.111
True, the 1970 discovery amendments had support from the careful
empirical work of the Columbia Discovery Project.112 But compare the 1966
revision and expansion of the class action rule. That was literally a leap into
the unknown. The drafters wanted a secure mooring for civil rights
injunction class actions,113 but they had no empirical (v. policy) grounds for
adopting the Rule 23(b)(3) “common questions” class action. And they
certainly did not foresee where it would lead. Thus, though the amended rule
did require judicial approval for settlement of class actions,114 that was almost
109
110

111

112
113

114

Marcus, supra note 40, at 780.
See John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case of Underhill
Moore, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 195, 264–73 (1980) (describing how Professor Underhill Moore of Yale
spent huge amounts of time and money in a failed effort to demonstrate the effect of parking laws
on parking behavior in New Haven).
See Pound, supra note 13, at 413–16 (describing results of Pound’s review of published appellate case
reports). In the same vein, consider Pound’s additional observation as follows:
[O]ur American reports bristle with fine points of appellate procedure. More than four
per cent. Of the digest paragraphs of the last ten volumes of the American Digest have to
do with Appeal and Error. In ten volumes of the Federal Reporter, namely volumes 129
to 139, covering decisions of the Circuit Courts from 1903 till the present, there is an
average of ten decisions upon points of appellate practice to the volume. Two case to the
volume, on the average, turn wholly upon appellate procedure.
Id. at 410. Contemporary empiricists go well beyond reported cases in providing the Advisory
Committee with empirical data.
See WILLIAM GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1968) (reporting the
results of that empirical investigation).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). The Committee Note accompanying that 1966 amendment explained
its focus: “Illustrative are various actions in the civil-rights field where a party is charged with
discriminating against a class, usually one whose members are incapable of specific enumeration.”
This explanation is followed by citation to eight cases, mainly involving desegregation of schools.
See Committee Note to 1966 amendment to Rule 23(b)(2).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(E) (1966) (“A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without
approval of the court, and notice of the proposal of the dismissal or compromise shall be given to
all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.”).

2486

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23:6

an afterthought, and the Committee almost certainly did not realize that
settlement would be the principal mode of resolving class actions.115
So for those in the twenty-first century to insist on an FDA quality
empirical basis and quality testing for rule changes before existing rules are
changed, there is the small question of why that which has been in place since
the 1930s or the 1960s—the Liberal Ethos—gets a pass on empirical support.
D. Operating in The Subcommittee Mode
When he testified before the House Judiciary Committee in 1983, Judge
Gignoux (then Chair of the Standing Committee) resisted the open meetings
plank of proposed legislation:
The evident desire of some critics to require open meetings indicates, we feel,
a misunderstanding of how the rules committees operate. The initial
meetings of an Advisory Committee are “drafting sessions” at which
proposals for changes in the rules are received from diverse sources and
drafts of proposed rules amendments are prepared for public circulation. As
a legislative analogy, the work at these meetings is similar to the drafting

115

Thus, here is the entirety of the Committee Note about Rule 23(e) as adopted in 1966: “Subdivision
(e) requires approval of the court, after notice, for the dismissal or compromise of any class action.”
See Notes of Advisory Comm. On Rules, 1966 amendments to Rule 23(e). This one-liner stands in
startling contrast to the Committee Note discussion of the handling of litigation classes, which was
obviously what the framers thought would be the ordinary use of the rule.
This is not to say that the risk of misuse of settlements in class actions passed entirely unnoticed
during the Advisory Committee deliberations in 1966. One of the members of the Committee then
was John Frank, and the Committee’s records reveal that he vehemently pressed the Committee
about settlement incentives in class actions under the revised rule, particularly the new Rule
23(b)(3):
Frank was particularly vexed with the insidious incentives that spurious [Rule 23(b)(3)]
class actions, whose judgments bound class members, presented to class counsel willing to
settle an action on less than the most favorable terms in exchange for an award of lucrative
attorney fees. In his view, defendant companies would “sell” a settlement to the lowest
bidder willing to settle a class action.
John Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23—What Were We Thinking?, 24 MISS. COLL. L. REV.
323, 335–36 (2005). This scenario came to be known as the “reverse auction”–the defendant would
try to get the lawyers who brought class actions to “bid” against one another by agreeing to lower
and lower settlements in order to obtain an award of attorney fees.
As all now recognize, the settlement class action, indeed class certification for settlement only,
became the dominant motif of post-1966 class action litigation. It gave rise to the possibility that
Rule 23 could by this means rewrite tort law. See Richard L. Marcus, They Can’t Do That, Can They?
Tort Reform via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 858, 859 (1995). Only in 2003, was additional detail
added to Rule 23(e), and that was bolstered by further expansion of the settlement-approval
provisions accomplished by amendments in 2018. See Richard L. Marcus, Evolution v. Revolution in
Class Action Reform, 96 N.C. L. REV. 903, 904–07 (2016). These amendments went into effect on
December 1, 2018.
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work done by a congressional committee staff prior to the introduction of a
bill in Congress for public debate and scrutiny.116

The 1988 Act included the open meetings requirement notwithstanding,
producing a number of benefits noted above. At the same time, the Advisory
Committee has come to rely also on subcommittees to do much (certainly
not all) of the sort of drafting work Judge Gignoux described. As summarized
by Judge Kravitz (then chair of the Advisory Committee) in a 2008
memorandum to the Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference, the
practice began after Judge Niemeyer became Chair of the Advisory
Committee in 1996, when there were simultaneous intense efforts on class
actions and discovery.117 That practice has continued on a regular basis since.
In a sense, one might regard this subcommittee practice to provide the
sort of preparatory activity that Judge Gignoux described. That drafting
activity can be intense and last a long time. As Judge Kravitz pointed out in
2008, the draft amendment to Rule 56 that was ultimately published for
public comment (as required under the 1988 Act) was the thirty-second draft
considered by the Rule 56 Subcommittee.118 There would likely be no way
for the full Committee to give the sort of sustained attention required to work
through that many drafts. The likely alternative might be for the Advisory
Committee Chair to collaborate with the Reporters on the drafting, but
involving a subcommittee is a much more productive way to identify and
resolve issues. Often subcommittees reach consensus on drafting choices,
which greatly facilitates the work of the entire Committee.
The work of the subcommittees is not done behind an impenetrable
curtain. When they are substantive, subcommittee conference calls or
meetings produce notes that are prepared and ordinarily included in agenda
books for the full Committee’s meetings, making those notes accessible also
to interested observers.
To take a striking example of such material, consider the Rule 37(e)
preservation issues that ultimately led to the 2015 amendment of that rule.
The November 2011 agenda book included more than 400 pages of

116

117

118

Hearings on Oversight and H.R. 41440 Before Subcomm. on Cts, C.L., and the Admin. of Just. of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 101 (1983) (statement of Hon. Edward Thaxter
Gignoux regarding H.R. 4144).
Advisory Comm. On Civ. Rules, Agenda: Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, U.S. Cts. at
135
(Nov.
17–18,
2008),
https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agendabooks/advisory-committee-rules-civil-procedure-november-2008.
Id. at 137.
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background material.119 After full Committee discussions, the Discovery
Subcommittee continued to work on the challenges of this set of issues. Thus,
the agenda book for the November 2012 Advisory Committee meeting
included seventy-four pages of notes on seven Discovery Subcommittee
conference calls about drafting Rule 37(e) on sanctions for failure to preserve
discoverable materials.120
And it is clear that at least some observers do attend to what is in those
notes. On occasion, those notes are invoked in later submissions on the topic
under consideration. So the subcommittee practice has both made the
difficult drafting task in the “fishbowl” manageable and also provided the
sort of public access that the 1988 Act sought.
The subcommittee method also enables outreach and something akin to
empirical work, though largely of the “armchair” variety. Subcommittees
often involve Advisory Committee members who have a particular interest
in, or experience with, the issues under study (usually both). These
subcommittee members can then gather information from other experienced
lawyers and also assist in the design and initiation lists for mini-conferences,
which are usually put on by subcommittees.
Those mini-conferences, in turn, generate information for agenda books
to inform the rest of the Advisory Committee on the work that the
subcommittee has done. One example is the September 11, 2015, miniconference held by the Rule 23 Subcommittee about a multitude of issues
under consideration for possible inclusion in a preliminary draft of
amendments to Rule 23(e). Those issues had been under study by the entire
Advisory Committee for several years, but not at the level of detail made
possible by the mini-conference. And for the ensuing Advisory Committee
meeting, the agenda book included twenty-three pages of notes on the
discussions at the mini-conference and the fifty-three-page background
memorandum provided to mini-conference participants.121
The intense study that the subcommittee method permits also can lead
to a decision that pursuing a rule change is not warranted. A recent example
is the question whether a rule should be adopted (perhaps on the model of
119
120

121

See generally Advisory Comm. On Civ. Rules, Agenda: Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules,
U.S. Cts at 53–469 (Nov. 7–8, 2011).
Advisory Comm. on Civ. Rules, Jud. Conf. of the U.S., Agenda: Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 137–
210 (Nov. 1–2, 2012), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CV2012-10.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4GQE-SQNL].
See Advisory Comm. on Civ. Rules, Jud. Conf. of the U.S., Agenda: Meeting of the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules at 163–240 (Nov. 5–6, 2015), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2015-11civil-agenda_book.pdf [https://perma.cc/N685-N4DG].
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Rule 23(f)) for interlocutory review of at least some “cross-cutting” issues in
at least some multidistrict (MDL) proceedings (sometimes called “mega”
MDLs). In part, this effort was assisted by submissions from interested
parties.122 Because the issues depended on a welter of competing
considerations, the consideration was long and arduous. Ultimately, MDL
Subcommittee members participated in about 15 conferences or meetings
about this possibility across the country, and at least three conferences largely
or solely focused on it. After all this work, along with careful examination of
existing case law, the MDL Subcommittee members (including all Advisory
Committee members engaged in active practice) unanimously recommended
in October 2020 that work on this rule change idea be discontinued,123 which
the Advisory Committee accepted.
Despite the extensive disclosure via agenda books of what the
subcommittees have been doing and regular review during full Advisory
Committee meetings of these subcommittee efforts, the Subcommittee
conference calls are not open to all, or regarded as subject to the openness
mandate of the 1988 Act. For one thing, the customary advance notice called
for (via the Federal Register, for example) would not be possible.
Subcommittee conference calls are arranged on short notice (and not always
easily arranged, given the crowded schedules of busy judges and lawyers in
different time zones). These conference calls permit tentative views to be
shared, and also are occasions when drafting ideas can be floated without
creating the impression that “the train has left the station” on a given
amendment effort. It has happened that outside observers have asked to be
permitted to listen in on these calls, but those requests have been politely
declined.
In sum, the subcommittee practice that the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee has adopted for the last quarter century provides both a method
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See Letter from John Beisner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, to Rebecca Womeldorf,
Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of Prac. and Proc. (Nov. 21, 2018) (detailing in a twenty-one page report
an
empirical
analysis
of
interlocutory
review
in
MDL
proceedings),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-cv-bb-suggestion_beisner_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z9F6-7YHL]; Letter from Brian Devine, Seeger Salvas & Devine LLP, to
Rebecca Womeldorf, Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of Prac. and Proc. (June 25, 2019) (arguing, based
upon a twenty-five page analysis of empirical information on interlocutory review in MDL
proceedings, that “no problem exists that could be solved by [the] proposed rule”),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/19-cv-p-suggestion_devine_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YH47-V9YN].
See Advisory Comm. on Civ. Rules, Jud. Conf. of the U.S., Agenda: Meeting of the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules at 154–60 (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/202010_civil_rules_agenda_book_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6TZ-L98Y].
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for the sort of intense drafting Judge Gignoux described and the public notice
that the framers of the Act sought. It might even be regarded as a win/win
response to the 1988 Act.
E. A Possible Downside—Stickiness
In 1987, Judge Posner referred to “[t]he ease and speed with which the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can be amended by those whom Congress
entrusted with the responsibility for doing so” as a reason for resisting
arguments to “create new forms of judicial proceeding in the teeth of the
existing rules.”124 That was before the 1988 Act. In 1993, Judge Winter, then
a member of the Advisory Committee, objected that “even amendments best
characterized as trivial or incremental may encounter enormous
resistance.”125 Fifteen years later, I observed that “in this politicized
environment almost everything is poisoned by suspicion; the most mundane
of changes provoke strident over-reactions from those who suspect a malign
hidden agenda.”126
Maybe that is not such a bad thing. Writing in 2015, Professor Burbank
described Chief Justice Burger’s efforts in the 1970s to “retrench” via rule
change as having a causal relation to the adoption of the 1988 Act: “[T]he
attempts to use court rulemaking for retrenchment that he [Chief Justice
Burger] encouraged caused a backlash, leading to changes in the Enabling
Act Process (and the Enabling Act itself) that had the effect, and for some the
purpose, of impeding retrenchment by Federal Rule.”127
Perhaps it is not coincidental that the initial disclosure draft rule
amendment published for comment in 1991 (right after the adoption of the
1988 Act) produced “a flood of objections unprecedented in 50-plus years of
judicial rule-making.”128 It was probably this outcry that Judge Winter had
in mind in his objections quoted above.129
At least from some perspectives, then, “stickiness” (a political science term
for difficulty in making change) may be a good thing. As a leading litigator
has put it, “[f]or practicing lawyers (not to mention trial judges), relentless
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Henson v. East Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 1987).
Ralph K. Winter, Foreword: In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 263, 263 (1993).
Marcus, supra note 35, at 308.
Burbank & Farhang, supra note 38, at 1562.
Ann Pelham, Judges Make Quite a Discovery: Litigators Erupt, Kill Plan to Reform Civil Rules, L. TIMES,
March 16, 1992, at 1.
See Winter, supra note 125.
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rulemaking is relentlessly inconvenient.”130 From an academic perspective,
stickiness might be attractive to the extent that it impedes change from the
Liberal Ethos for procedure that was installed in the 1934-1970 era. But even
those generally ill-disposed toward rule changes may welcome the ones that
really matter. Thus, the lawyer who criticized “relentless rulemaking” also
strongly endorsed serious attention to rule changes to address spoliation (as
was done in Rule 37(e)).131
At the same time, stickiness can be overdone. On that score, one example
might be the Rule 30(b)(6) project, dealing with depositions of organizational
litigants. This project initially included discussion of a variety of ideas that
were not ultimately in the preliminary draft published for public comment,
which included only a directive that the parties confer about the matters to
be subject to examination and the identity of the organizational
representative to testify.132 That is a pretty cautious proposal, particularly in
comparison to some of the more aggressive ideas originally offered.
Notwithstanding, more than 1780 public comments were submitted,
many dealing with topics not included in the actual published amendment
proposal. Eventually, the directive to discuss the identity of the witness was
not included in the amendment, which went into effect on December 1,
2020. It will hopefully produce some positive change. It will not revolutionize
30(b)(6) depositions.
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Gregory Joseph, An Instinct for the Capillary, LITIGATION, Summer/Fall 2012, at 9.
See id. (“Spoliation litigation is a prime example [of a major issue]. It is the sport of the century. It’s
an extreme sport with often fatal consequences.”).
Mr. Joseph thought very differently of another Advisory Committee project—the restyling of the
entire set of Civil Rules:
The rulemaking process too often displays an instinct for the capillary. I won’t get started
on the whole notion of “restyling.” Rewriting every rule to say the same thing but with
better syntax is a sort of a Lady Bird Johnson approach to rulemaking—the highway sits
in exactly the same place but has been beautified. Is there someone who reads the rules for
their syntax? Too much attention is devoted to minute refinements.
Id. What is striking about this comment is that Greg Joseph agreed to join Professor Burbank in
an exceptionally valuable effort to review and evaluate that rewriting of the entire set of Civil Rules.
See generally Advisory Comm. on Civ. Rules, Jud. Conf. of the U.S., Agenda: Meeting of the Advisory Comm.
on Civ. Rules (Nov. 18, 2005), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CV200511.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FN7-S5D3] (containing the very detailed report compiled by Burbank
and Joseph and the blue ribbon consortium they assembled to perform that review). We are eternally
grateful.
See supra text accompanying notes 100–101.
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F. The Alternative Route Through Congress
Political scientists who speak of “stickiness” probably have Congress in
mind. But on occasion Congress may become “unstuck” on procedural
reform. To take an example from the same era as the 1988 Act, consider the
Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) of 1990.133 That called for each district in
the nation to appoint a local CJRA Advisory Group.134 It emerged from the
Senate Judiciary Committee headed by then-Senator Biden.135 As one of the
aides to that Senate Committee put it, it represented a “users united” attitude
to counterbalance the “near-mystical reverence of the rulemaking authority
exercised by the Judicial Conference.”136 In 1996, Professor Geyh noted “a
startling transformation of the Judiciary’s role” due to the more active
posture of Congress.137 Indeed, representatives of Congressional judiciary
committees sometimes take the initiative to influence the Advisory
Committee’s work.138
It can sometimes seem that Congress—or at least one house of
Congress—is a bit unsticky. One example is the Fairness in Class Action
Litigation Act of 2017.139 This legislation included many aggressive changes
to class action practice and a variety of new provisions for MDL litigation
that corresponded to topics under study by the MDL Subcommittee of the
Advisory Committee.140 It was introduced on a Thursday. By the following
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See Marcus, supra note 115, at 800–05 (commenting on the “sudden appearance and passage” of
the CJRA).
Id. at 801 (reporting that since 1990, all ninety-four federal districts had created Advisory Groups
that study local docket conditions and develop district plans to cope with litigation expense and
delay). I admit to having served as Reporter of the Northern District of Cal. Advisory Group for
several years.
See Jeffrey Peck, “Users United”: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
105, 105 (1991) (“Across the country, federal district courts have been implementing the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990 (‘the CJRA” or ‘The Act’), widely referred to as the ‘Biden Bill’ in
recognition of its principal sponsor, Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D. Delaware), chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee.”).
Id. at 117.
Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary’s Imperiled Role in Congress,
71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1169 (1996).
See Richard L. Marcus, How to Steer an Ocean Liner, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV., 615, 616–17 (2014)
(contrasting letter from member of House Judiciary Committee to the Advisory Committee urging
constraints on discovery, with the November 5, 2013 hearing before the Senate Judiciary
Committee criticizing the package of discovery amendments the Advisory Committee had actually
published as possibly imposing undue constraints on discovery).
H.R. 985, 115th Cong. (2017).
For discussion of this bill, see Howard M. Erichson, Searching for Salvageable Ideas in FICALA, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 19 (2018) (“The bill represents the most aggressive attempt in recent memory
to dismantle the apparatus of mass litigation through procedural reform”).
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Tuesday morning, a letter from the Chairs of the Advisory Committee and
the Standing Committee reporting many concerns about the proposed
legislation was hand delivered to the chairs and ranking minority members
of both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees.141 Notwithstanding that
commentary (and other commentary), and without regard to efforts by
Democratic members of Congress, no hearings were held on this bill. And
the bill did not receive unanimous support from Republican House
members. To the contrary, a group of Republican representatives called the
House Liberty Caucus issued a statement opposing it.142 Nevertheless, the
House passed the bill about a month after it was introduced, without holding
any hearings.143 The Senate did not act on the bill, however. At least in this
instance the Senate was sticky even though the House was not.
So rulemaking may sometimes be stickier than Congress. The topics
addressed in the 2017 bill passed by the House were closely examined by two
Advisory Committee subcommittees—the Rule 23 Subcommittee and the
MDL Subcommittee. The actual Rule 23 changes that went into effect in
2018 were not nearly as aggressive as those in the bill. And the MDL
Subcommittee has not yet concluded that any rule changes are warranted
despite giving intense attention to various topics addressed in the 2017 House
bill. If, as Professor Burbank has put it, the Enabling Act is a “treaty” between
Congress and the rulemakers,144 it may sometimes seem that Congress is not
adhering to the treaty.
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See Letter from Judge David Campbell, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Prac. and Proc. and Judge John
Bates, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civ. Rules, to Hon. Robert Goodlatte, Chairman, House
Comm. on the Judiciary (Feb. 14, 2017) (criticizing H.R. 985, the Fairness in Class Action Litigation
Act of 2017, for amending the federal rules “by legislation rather than through the deliberative
process of the Rules Enabling Act.”). This letter is included in the Supplemental Materials for the
June 12–13, 2017, meeting of the Standing Committee 40–42 (available at www.uscourts.gov), and
can also be found with a Google search. Despite the reservations expressed by Judges Campbell
and Bates (and others), the House passed the bill in March 2017 without holding a hearing. The
Senate did not act on the bill.
See Marcus, supra note 115, at 939 n.196 (2016) (quoting the House Liberty Caucus’s Letter that
class action lawsuits are “a preferable alternative to government regulation because they impose
damages only on bad actors rather than imposing compliance costs on entire industries.”). For a
thorough argument favoring private litigation via the class action to government regulation, see
BRIAN FITZPATRICK, THE CONSERVATIVE CASE FOR CLASS ACTIONS 58–73 (2019) (arguing
that conservatives should favor use of class actions because they depend on private initiative rather
than action by government).
See Erichson, supra note 140, at 19–20.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Compared to the Second Founding of the post-Civil War era,
Rulemaking’s Second Founding has been a signal success. Indeed, both
Professor Foner145 and Professor Woodward146 referred to the civil rights
revolution of the 1950s and 1960s as a “Second Reconstruction” because the
Second Founding did not work. Perhaps it never could have worked; the
Panic of 1873 and resulting depression likely guaranteed what did happen in
1877—the end of Reconstruction and what can be seen as the North’s
abandonment of the promises embodied in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and
fifteenth Amendments. Only with the Warren Court did those return toward
the fore. We continue to have unfinished business on these fronts today.
Rulemaking’s Second Founding, on the other hand, has endured and
produced positive effects. Had all the ideas mentioned during the process
leading up to the 1988 Act actually been included in the legislation that was
adopted, it might be a great deal more difficult to take this view of it.147 But
perhaps my judgment is pollyannish. As Professor Burbank said about me
with regard to an article on rulemaking I wrote nearly twenty years ago, “he
remains, for my taste, a bit too old-fashioned in the apparent nostalgia he
feels for the simpler days when the experts controlled the process, Congress
was essentially indifferent to it, and everyone had to live with the results.”148
Well, some things never change. With gratitude to Professor Burbank, I look
forward to continuing to operate under the regime of Rulemaking’s Second
Founding.
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See Foner, supra note 1, at 169.
See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE BURDEN OF SOUTHERN HISTORY 107 (1960).
I have in mind Rep. Holtzman’s proposal that no rule amendment take effect without an affirmative
vote of Congress. She proposed that the authority to adopt rule changes be moved from the
Supreme Court to the Judicial Conference, but also the following new 28 U.S.C. § 2074(f): “Rules
adopted under this chapter shall not take effect until they have been approved by Act of Congress.”
See Cong. Rec. – House, Jan. 15, 1979, at 65. The enormous effort involved to get FED. R. EVID.
502 enacted by Congress stands as a caution against any such requirement for action by Congress.
Stephen B. Burbank, The Roles of Litigation, 80 WASH. UNIV. L.Q., 705, 720 (2002). He added that
the 2002 article was “informed and judicious—one might even say old-fashioned,” but explained
in a footnote: “This is a compliment.” Id. n. 68.

